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Abstract
Vacancy is a common phenomenon across developed countries. For policymak-
ers, vacancy is undesirable as it challenges housing affordability, especially in large
cities. The implementation of a tax on vacant housing is becoming a more popular
tool among lawmakers, however this fiscal instrument has never been properly eval-
uated. This paper provides the first evaluation of a tax on vacant housing. First,
I develop a model to understand the mechanisms of vacancy creation. Then, I use
the quasi-experimental setting of the implementation of a tax on vacancy in France
in 1999 to identify the causal direct effect of the tax on the vacancy rate. Exploiting
an exhaustive fiscal data-set, which contains information on every dwelling in France
from 1995 to 2013, I implement a Difference-in-Difference approach combined with a
Propensity Score Matching strategy. Results suggest that the tax was responsible of
a 13% decrease in vacancy rates between 1997 and 2001. The impact is specially con-
centrated in long-term vacancy. Results also suggest that most of the vacant dwellings
moved to primary residences.1
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1 Introduction
Vacancies in the housing market are a relatively common phenomenon across Western
countries. In 2005, vacancy rates amounted to 10% in the Euro Area (Eiglsperger and
Haine, 2009) and 12.7% in the US.2 While for economists, some level of vacancy seems
intrinsic to the way markets work, politicians and activists have criticized this situation
arguing that high vacancy rates are undesirable and need to be tackled to improve housing
affordability. Indeed, access to housing has worsen in recent years, as suggested by the
increasing proportion of households’ disposable income spent on housing. Since, various
interventions have been proposed to deal with vacancy which range from a tax on vacant
dwellings to forced conversion into social housing. Assessing the effect of such interventions
at the local market is crucial to understand the role played by governments and local
authorities in shaping property owners’ incentives in the housing market.
In this paper, I exploit a natural experiment in order to identify the causal effect of
taxing vacant dwellings. I assess the French context where a tax on vacant dwellings was
implemented in some municipalities in 1999. To my knowledge, this is the first evaluation
of an implementation of a tax on vacancy and the first time that administrative data is
used for this purpose. I use an exhaustive fiscal data-set to measure vacancy rates and
I apply a matching difference-in-difference strategy to compare municipalities that were
subject to the tax to those where the tax was not applicable.
Demand for housing has not ceased to increase in OECD countries in recent years as
a result of net migration and reduction of credit constraints (Andrews, 2010). Similarly,
other demographic aspects have also been pressuring housing demand such as ageing and
the reduction of the average household size. In a context of low supply elasticity, like
European countries,3 increases in housing demand tend to capitalise into higher prices.
This situation is further exacerbated by a high population density, land scarcity and rigid
construction regulation.4 Moreover, due to the concentration of population in urban areas,
housing markets tend to be tighter in large cities.
It can seem paradoxical that a situation of increasing demand for housing and inelas-
tic supply coexists with considerably high levels of vacancy in many European countries.
As a matter of fact, it is crucial to understand why vacancy exists and whether it represents
a market failure or an optimal outcome in equilibrium. Previous literature has identified
market frictions as the primary source of vacancy. However, vacancy can also be a results
of a rational decision of the owner. For instance, in a context of strong tenant protection
like in the French rental market, an owner may prefer to keep an apartment vacant than
to rent it if he fears rent default risk. Similarly, if the uncertainty about the evolution of
house prices or rents is high, an owner can decide to wait before selling or renting keeping
the unit vacant for a longer period.
The presence of frictional vacancy and inactive housing combined with a situation
of tight housing markets, can prompt governments to intervene to improve housing afford-
ability. Notably, policy makers can try to compensate the distortions caused by tenant
regulation and the real option problem by taxing vacant units. As stated by Kline and
2Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey, Series H-111, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington,
DC 20233
3 Caldera and Johansson (2013) estimate the housing supply elasticity for various OECD countries and
found France to be among the least responsive markets, with an elasticity of 0.363.
4In Paris, buildings can have a maximum height of 25m in the centric districts and 31m in the periphery.
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Moretti (2014), the presence of pre-existing distortions is one of the arguments that can
justify the implementation of placed-based policies. Moreover, focusing on vacancy re-
duction may be a faster and easier way to improve housing affordability than promoting
construction of new housing units.
Nevertheless, the benefits of reducing vacancy might go beyond redistribution pur-
poses. In fact, there is some empirical evidence showing other social consequences of empty
housing due to negative externalities. Firstly, concentrations of vacant housing tend to re-
duce the value of the properties in the area (Lee, 2008; Fitzpatrick, 2012). Secondly, the
increase in the perception of insecurity has also been identified as a consequence of the
concentration of vacant houses, which can derive in an increase in the delinquency rate
and damage social cohesion (Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Mummolo and Brubaker, 2008).
Therefore, the justification for government intervention to reduce vacancy comes both from
the potential redistributive effect of using more intensively current housing stock and from
the reduction of negatives externalities entailed by vacancy.
Governments have historically intervened in the housing market in a number of
ways. However, few have directly tackled the reduction of vacancy, one of the reasons
being the limited set of tools available. Similarly, the difficulty to define and measure
vacancy – where there is no consensus so far (de La Morvonnais and Chentouf, 2000) – is
another important challenge. Nevertheless, there have been some initiatives across OECD
countries aiming to decrease vacancy rates. The Netherlands has historically opted for
decriminalising squatting.5 In the US, local governments have enacted vacant property
registration ordinances in order to keep a better account of vacant dwellings. They ask
the owners for multiple notifications and for property maintenance requirements and they
usually charge a fee at the time of registration (Schilling, 2009).
As the interest for a tax on vacant dwellings rises, there is an increasing number of
countries that have implemented this policy. Since April 2013, municipalities in the UK
can choose to charge up to 50% more of the Council Tax, a tax on housing properties, for
vacant units. The reform is still very recent and, to my knowledge, no evaluation has taken
place yet. Jerusalem has also implemented a kind of vacancy tax in the form of doubling
the Arnona tax (a municipality tax on property) for properties that have been empty for
more than six months.
In France, a vacancy tax called Taxe sur les Logement Vacants or TLV was introduced
in 1999 in urban municipalities of more than 200,000 inhabitants that had a substantial
disequilibrium between housing supply and demand. The tax was then extended to other
municipalities in 2006 and modified again in 2013. Although the policy has been in place
for a long time, there is still no robust empirical study assessing the impact of this tax.
To my knowledge, the only attempt to asses the impact of a tax on vacant housing
is the one conducted by Blossier (2012) in the context of France. He exploits the extension
of the tax in 2006 to some cities to identify the effect through a Propensity Score Matching
strategy. He uses data from the national census which provides data on vacancy every 9
years and finds that the tax is ineffective in reducing the vacancy rate. Unfortunately, the
spaced frequency of the census data challenges the identification strategy.
Desgranges and Wasmer (2000) propose a theoretical model to assess a tax on va-
cancy in which equilibrium rents are determined as the result of a Nash bargaining equi-
librium between home seekers and homeowners on a housing market with stochastic search
5Vacant Property Act in 1981 Priemus (2011)
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frictions on both sides. In their setting, vacancy can result from a stochastic mismatch by
the owners, who can maintain a bargaining power to fix higher rents levels by rationing
stocks. In this context, taxing vacant housing units increases the incentive of the owners to
rent their housing unit at a lower rent because it increases their opportunity cost to keep
it vacant. Moreover, such policy should increase the home seekers’ bargaining power on
the housing market and allow them to extract some extra surplus by exerting downward
pressures on rent levels.
However, in their model, the possibility of owners voluntarily keeping their units
out of the market is not contemplated. In this paper, I develop a theoretical model to
better understand voluntary vacancy and the potential impact of a tax by introducing
a participation constraint in the Desgranges and Wasmer (2000) model. In particular, I
allow apartments to be inactive and I assess how a tax on vacancy can affect the stock of
inactive housing. The model predicts that a tax on vacancy will increase the number of
housing units that are offered in the market by increasing participation while decreasing
rents in the short term.
Then, I empirically test these predictions by exploiting the fact that the tax on
vacancy in France was introduced only in some municipalities to perform a Difference-
in-Difference strategy combined with a Propensity Score Matching. I construct a control
group out of the non-taxed municipalities that shared only one of the two criteria of the
taxed group and I weight them according to their similarity to the municipalities in the
taxed group.
The results suggest a negative and significant impact of the implementation of TLV
equivalent to a decrease of 0.8 percentage points of the vacancy rate, which implies a 13%
decrease in vacancy. This result is robust to the use of different specifications, the change
of control group and several other robustness test. I also find that the effect is 50% higher
in municipalities with an initial high level of vacancy. My results contradict the ones of
Blossier (2012) which showed a limited impact of the tax in reducing vacancy.
The effect is concentrated in long term vacancy, which suggests that indeed a tax
on vacancy can be an efficient tool to reintroduce into the market dwellings that had been
unused for a long time. Finally, I find that most of the vacant units seem to have shifted
to primary residences while I do not find any significant impact on new construction at
the medium term.
This paper also relates to the abundant branch of literature that empirically evaluate
the impact of housing policies. One strand of the literature focuses on demand-side poli-
cies, usually housing allowances. Recent evidence shows that housing allowances can have
inflationary effects due to the low elasticity of supply (in France, Laferrère and Le Blanc
(2004); Fack (2005); Grislain-Letrémy and Trevien (2014) and elsewhere, Gibbons and
Manning (2006); Kangasharju (2003); Susin (2002)). In particular, due to the short-term
rigidity of the supply, part of the benefit from the government is directly shifted to the
owner through an increase in price. Another strand of the literature investigates the effi-
ciency of supply-side policies, such as subsidised construction. Several authors in the US
have assessed the spillover effects of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) on
property value resulting in mix evidence (Ellen et al. (2007), Nguyen (2005) and (Di and
Murdoch, 2013)).
As per the empirical evidence concerning vacant housing, the amount of research
is more scant. In Cheshire et al. (2015), the authors identify the role played by urban
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planning on determining vacancy rates in local housing markets. They point out the net
effect of two opposite forces at stake: an opportunity cost effect and a mismatch effect.
Their findings suggest that the local planning restrictiveness results in higher vacancy
rates, meaning that the mismatch effect dominates over the opportunity cost effect.
The paper is organised as follows, in Section 2, I develop a theoretical model to
better understand vacancy creation. In Section 3 I describe the institutional setting and
the particularities of the tax implementation. In Section 4 I present the data, in Section 5
the empirical strategy used. Section 6 reports the main results, Section 7, the robustness
tests and Section 8 provides the results on other outcome exploring the existing mechanisms
behind the effect. Section 9 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
Vacancy occurs due to the existence of several market frictions (Merlo and Ortalo-
Magne, 2004; Han and Strange, 2015). First, houses are heterogeneous which implies that
consumers and sellers need to spend time in a costly searching process. In fact, given
the dependance of the housing market on current housing stock (due to immobility, long
construction time and high costs), supply may fail to match demand in the sense that it
does not meet the desired quality or location characteristics of the demand. Therefore
households might be forced to search even longer for a suitable match. Second, there are
significantly high transaction costs such as taxes or agency fees. And third, transactions
are made under uncertainty, which implies that some negotiation takes place. As a result of
these factors, there will be frictional vacancy in the housing market, which is an involuntary
kind of vacancy. Indeed, landowners would like to rent/sell their units but are struggling
to find a tenant/buyer due to frictions. This implies that units that are vacant due to
frictions are open vacancies; they are by some means advertised. Given that frictions can
never be fully eliminated, in equilibrium, there is a positive level of structural vacancy
(Wheaton, 1990) equivalent to the natural rate of unemployment in the labour market.
However, owners can also decide to voluntarily leave their units out of the market
due to two main reasons. First, real options in the housing market can play an important
role. Cunningham (2006) shows that house-price uncertainty delays home construction
and raises the value of vacant land. Similarly, in the presence of price uncertainty, an
owner can choose to delay a transaction if he expects that prices will increase. In fact,
one could expect in the housing market a similar mechanism than the one observed in
the second generation of job search models in which unemployed workers searching for a
job can decide not to accept some offers, even above their reservation wage, expecting to
find better ones by continuing to search the market (see Pissarides (1986)). For example,
vacancy can be an opportunity to restore or improve the quality of a depreciated housing
unit or to better search the demand side to extract more surplus of a rent or a sale. In
this case, the opportunity cost of vacancy can be compensated by an anticipated increase
in housing prices or rents.
Second, Gabriel and Nothaft (2001) suggest that in the presence of restrictions on
rents adjustment (such as tenant regulations), there may be some strategic holding of
vacant units. Indeed, high levels of tenant protection can result in voluntary or strategic
vacancy. For instance, if an owner cannot terminate a rent contract at particular time
nor freely adjust the rent price, he might rationally decide to take the unit out of the
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rental market. In France, regulation is strongly pro-tenant: the minimum length of rental
contracts is three years, the owner can ask for a maximum of one month deposit and the
average time to evict a tenant is significantly high.6 Therefore, in the French context
vacancy can indeed be a result of a rational decision of the owner facing either the option
problem or a strong tenant regulation. In this case, voluntary vacancies are inactive stock,
meaning they are not advertised to be rent or sold. In equilibrium, the optimal level of
vacancy can be a positive level that includes frictional vacancy and inactive stock, provided
the conditions for the latter to be a rational choice hold.
Desgranges and Wasmer (2000) – DW henceforth – develop a model of search and
matching in rental housing markets to assess the impact of a tax on vacant units. They
use the matching function developed by Pissarides (2000) to describe labor markets and
translate it to the housing market. In their model, DW assume that that all owners
participate in the housing market and hence their properties are either rented or looking for
a tenant. Given the French context, I believe it is pertinent to develop a model that allows
owners to voluntarily keep their unit vacant. In this paper, I introduce a participation
constraint in a simplified version of DW model to account for the fact that owners can
rationally decide not to participate in the rental market – hereinafter Participation (P)
model–.
The basic framework of the model is as in DW. There is a continuum [0, A] of
apartments uniformly distributed in a city and a continuum [0,W ] of workers. Apartments
are owned by the same continuum [0, A] of owners and decide whether to participate in
the rental market. If they do, they either look for a tenant (V ) or already have a tenant
(O). Workers either look for an apartment (S) or are already in one (T ).
Following the standard hypothesis of search and matching models, I define x(s, v) as
the matching function with s being the number of people looking for an apartment and v
the number of vacant units on the market. Noting θ = v/s as the market tightness we find
the following matching probabilities:
(1) q(θ) = x(s, v)/v = x(1/θ, 1)
(2) λ(θ) = x(s, v)/s = x(1, θ)
where equation (1) gives the probability of finding a tenant while equation (2) is the
probability of finding an apartment.
I can now define the present-discounted utilities of each of the four possible states in
a form of four Bellman equations:
(3) rS = z + λ(θ).(Tj − S)
(4) rTj = u−Rj + δ(S − Tj)
(5) rVj = −t+ q(θ).(Oj − Vj)
(6) rOj = Rj + δ(Vj −Oj)
where r is the discount rate, z > 0 is the utility flow independent from housing,
u > z is the fixed utility of living in an apartment, t is the tax on vacant units and Rj is
the rent. I can then compute the gains from renting as:
6estimated to be around 226 days by Djankov et al. (2002)
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(7) Oj − Vj = Rj + t
r + δ + q(θ)
To determine the rent, I use the Nash bargaining solution like in DW (see their
paper for calculation details). The optimal rent is obtained after maximising total surplus
(Tj − S)β(Oj − Vj)1−β where β is tenant’s bargaining power. From the solution to this
problem I obtain the following Rent Bargaining curve in the (θ,R∗) plane:
(RB) R∗ = K1(θ)[u− z + t]− t
with equation K1 equal to
(8) K1(θ) =
(1− β)(r + δ + q(θ))
r + δ + βλ(θ) + (1− β)q(θ) ∈ [0, 1] with
dK1(θ)
dθ
< 0 ∀θ
In order to include a participation dimension, I add a fifth present-discounted utility:
(9) rVj ≥ bj − t
Equation 9 indicates that owners offer their apartment in the housing market if the
discounted value of having a vacant unit on the market is greater or equal than the utility
of having an empty unit (bj) minus the tax (t). bj can be interpreted as the utility derived
from being able to use the apartment at any time or as the lack of rent default risk. There
is then a cutoff value b∗ such that all owners with a bj > b∗ do not participate in the rental
housing market. When replacing equations 5, 7 and RB into 9, we can obtain the optimal
b∗ as a function of θ:
(10) b∗ = q(θ)
K1(θ)(u− z + t)
r + δ + q(θ)
with
b∗
dθ
< 0 ∀θ
The proportion of inactive apartments can be writen as i/A = 1− F (b∗). Note that
a tax on vacant apartments reduces inactivity by increasing the optimal b∗.
Like in DW, in the steady state, market tightness θ, the number of vacant units v,
the number of searchers s and the number of occupied units o are constant. Moreover,
in the steady state there are no transition in and out of inactivity, hence the number of
inactive units i is fixed. Then, noting that o = W − s = A − i − v, the stationarity
conditions needed to close the model are:
(11) λ.s = δ.o
(12) q.v = δ.o
From the stationary conditions and using the relation θ = λ/q I obtain the following
steady state conditions:
λ(θ) = δ
A− i− θW
W − (A− i) = δ
AF (b∗)− θW
W −AF (b∗)
q(θ) =
δ
θ
A− i− θW
W − (A− i) =
δ
θ
AF (b∗)− θW
W −AF (b∗)
o(θ) =
A− i− θW
1− θ =
AF (b∗)− θW
1− θ
(13)
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In the short term, both the stock of housing and the total number of workers are
fixed. Hence the optimal market tightness can be obtained by plotting equation 2 and the
first steady state condition in 13. While in the DW model the first steady state condition
is a linear function of θ, in the Participation model it depends on the model parameters.
I calibrate this curve by giving different plausible values to the parameters and I find
that, when W > A − i, the curve is decreasing and convex in θ7. Figure 1 plots first
equation in 13 for different scenarios. One can notice that introducing the participation
dimension reduces the optimal level of market tightness (θ∗P,t=0 < θ
∗
DW ). Moreover, while
the introduction of a tax on vacancy does not change the equilibrium level of θ in the DW
model, it does affect θ in the Participation model. In fact, introducing a tax on vacant
units brings the equilibrium θ closer to the DW level where full participation is assumed.
It is important to take into account the effect of t in θ when assessing the effect
of a tax on inactivity i. Knowing that i depends negatively on b∗, I am interested in
determining the impact of the tax on b∗ (directly and also through θ). Again, I calibrate
this equation with plausible values of the model parameters and I find that ∂b∗/∂t > 0.
Hence, when a tax on vacancy is introduced inactivity decreases.
Figure 1: Equilibrium level of θ
θ
λ(θ)
θ∗P,t=0 θ
∗
P,t>0 θ
∗
DW
I then plot in Figure 2 two Rent Bargaining curves – with and without tax – with
the optimal level of θ to obtain the optimal rent. We observe that the introduction of
a tax reduces rents in both models although the reduction is larger in the Participation
model since it also comes from the fact that θ∗ has increased. In fact, in DW model, rents
decrease because owners are willing to accept lower prices in order to reduce their vacancy
duration and hence pay lower taxes. In the Participation model, the rent reduction is
caused not only by the previous mechanisms but also by the fact that more apartments
that were previously inactive are reincorporated into the market.
Like in DW, two last equations in the (v, s) plane complete the model: v = λ∗.s and
the stationary condition – SS – (9), which is a Beveridge curve
7In order to do the calibration I assume a matching function in the form of x0θα and an F (.) in the
form of the uniform cumulative distribution. The range of values used for calibration are x0 ∈ (0, 10], α ∈
(0, 1), z ∈ [0,∞), u ∈ [0,∞), r ∈ [0, 1], δ ∈ (0, 1], t ∈ [0,∞) and β ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 2: Steady State of θ∗ and R∗
θ
R∗
RBt>0
RBt=0
θ∗P,t=0 θ
∗
P,t>0 θ
∗
DW
R∗P,t=0
R∗P,t>0
R∗DW,t>0
R∗DW,t=0
(SS) λ(v/s).s = δ.(W − s)
Figure 3 shows that the equilibrium level of vacancies increases with the introduction
of a tax, bringing it closer to the equilibrium of the full participation model (DW).
Figure 3: Steady State of v∗ and s∗
s
v
SS
v/s = θ∗DW
v/s = θ∗P,t>0
v/s = θ∗P,t=0
v∗P,t=0
v∗P,t>0
v∗DW,t>0
In the housing market, the number of vacancies on the market is rarely separated
from non-participation in the market. Hence, total vacancy is usually defined in official
records as:
(14) V = v + i
In order to determine the impact on V of the introduction of a tax, it is necessary
to know if the decrease in i is larger or lower that the increase in v. One way is to look
at the alternative state o. Knowing that the total stock of housing A is fixed in the short
term and equal to i+ v + o, if part of the decrease in i translates also into an increase in
o it would mean that total vacancy decreases since ∆i > ∆v. When I calibrate the third
equation in 13, I find that ∂o(θ)/∂t > 0. Hence, when the tax on vacancy increases, the
number of occupied units increases as well (since θ increases) and therefore V decreases.
9
In conclusion, this simple model helps us to understand the consequences of the
implementation of a tax on vacant units. The introduction of impartial participation in
the model allows us to separate the impact on the flow of apartments offered in the market
(positive) from the impact on inactive housing units (negative). The model predicts that
the decrease in inactive units will translate both in an increase of vacant and occupied
apartments and hence total vacancy, as defined by official record, will decreases. For the
remaining of the paper, I use the term vacant to refer to the sum of the stock of vacant units
on the market plus the inactive units. In the following sections, I take these predictions to
the data to evaluate to what extend they can be validated empirically.
Unfortunately, the model does not allow us to evaluate the impact of the tax in the
long term, where A and W are no longer fixed. Intuitively, one could think of more complex
forces in the long term that make predictions on price effects more ambiguous. On the
one hand, there is the negative incentive for new construction in taxed cities, which could
lead to higher equilibrium housing prices and rents. There can also be positive effects on
equilibrium prices if I consider that high vacancy rates come with some negative amenities
(urban crimes, increased fire risks, reduced social interactions at a local level, etc.) which
are capitalised into lower housing prices and rents. A reduction of vacancy will then reduce
as well such negative amenities and hence translate in higher prices. On the other hand,
a long term deflationary price effect could be expected if I consider the impact of vacancy
periods on housing quality. By reducing the frequency and the length of vacancy, this
type of policy could reduce the speed of regeneration or quality improvement of the actual
housing stock, which could lead to lower long run equilibrium prices. In the empirical part,
I assess the impact of a vacancy tax on housing prices in the medium term.
3 Institutional setting
In France, where 3,6 million people are housed under unsatisfactory conditions (Fon-
dation Abbé-Pierre, 2014), housing is a sensitive topic. The intervention of the government
on the housing market is substantial, corresponding to a 2% of the budget in 2010, twice
the EU25 average, 0.9% (EUROSTAT, 2010). The implementation of a tax on vacancy
changed incentives of the owners both directly and through its interaction with other ex-
isting housing taxes. Hence, it is important to take into account the fiscal environment
when the tax was implemented.
Like in many other countries, in France there is a property tax (Taxe Foncière)
charged on owners of habitation, commercial or industrial dwellings. It is a municipal tax
whose base is one half of the rental value8 and whose rates are decided at the local level,
with an average of 29% at the national level in 2004.
A part from a tax on property, there is also another tax on housing (Taxe d’Habitation
or TH) to be paid by every individual living in a dwelling, either in ownership or tenancy
regime and both for primary and for secondary residences. Therefore, this tax is charged to
all dwellings but empty ones. It is as well a municipal tax; hence tax rates are decided by
local authorities. In 2003, the average tax rate of the TH for all municipalities in France was
8.8% and for the municipalities in the group of analysis it was 14.5%, this is equivalent to
513e on average.9 All primary residences are subject to tax allowances, some of which are
8Estimated yearly rent income.
9Unfortunately, the information on tax rates from before the implementation of the tax on vacancy is
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imposed by the central government and others are decided at the council level. Moreover,
there are also full exemptions for low-income households, disabled individuals and people
over 60 years old who are under a certain income threshold. On average, households pay
for their primary residence an effective tax rate which is 1.5 percentage points lower than
the level established by the municipality. Hence, the TH is only fully paid by owners of
secondary residences and by high income households on their primary residences.
On July 29th 1998, the French government passed a law to create a tax on vacant
dwellings (Taxe sur les Logements Vacants or TLV), which was then implemented on
January 1st 1999. The rationale behind the introduction of TLV was to encourage owners
of empty dwellings to re-introduce their properties into the market in order to improve
the efficiency of the current housing stock in areas with a high demand for housing. The
tax concerned only those municipalities belonging to urban units10 of more than 200,000
inhabitants and with a “substantial disequilibrium” between supply and demand at the
expense of low-income people. The list of the concerned municipalities was published in
the Décret Numéro 981249 on December 29th 1998. It included 680 municipalities in eight
urban units (Paris, Lyon, Lille, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, Nice and Cannes-Grasse-
Antibes).
The tax concerned all those dwellings with a minimum level of comfort that had
been vacant, i.e. empty of furniture, for more than 2 years. A vacant dwelling is defined
as a unit that has been inhabited for less than 30 consecutive days during the previous
two years. The TLV has an increasing tax rate which base is the rental value, this is, the
potential annual rent that the property could produce had it been rented.11 In particular,
the tax rate of TLV is equal to the 10% of the rental value during the first year when the
tax is due (after 2 years of vacancy), 12,5% for the second year (between 3 and 4 years)
and 15% for longer periods (more than 4 years of vacancy). This means that the TLV is in
average lower than the TH for the first and the second year but higher for longer periods
of vacancy. The average rental value for the group of taxed municipalities is 3,543e, hence
the amount of the tax will be 354e, the first year, 443e for the second year of vacancy
and 532e onward. Public housing, dwellings requiring important reconstruction works or
affected by urban plans of rehabilitation or demolition and involuntarily vacant units are
exempted from the tax. Involuntary vacant units include dwellings that are on the market
but cannot find a renter or a buyer.
Each household can have only one primary residence, which is defined as the dwelling
where they usually live and where they have the center of the professional and material
interests. Any other dwelling owned by the same household will be considered either
a secondary residence (if it pays the TH) or a vacant dwelling. In the latter case, the
tax authorities will collect the vacancy tax, provided that the dwelling is in one of the
municipalities concerned by the tax. Households can then contest the payment of the tax
through different ways. First they can prove that the dwelling is in fact occupied providing
electricity or water bills and a copy of the payment of the TH. Second, they can prove that
not available
10INSEE defines a “urban unit” as an area of continuous construction (without a separation of more than
200 meters between buildings) with at least 2,000 inhabitants.
11Rental value does not properly represent the value of the house. This is due to the fact that the
methodology applied to compute it uses a fixed rate to update the value of the rental value from 1970.
While the law that established such methodology in 1974 expected an update every two years and a general
revision every six years, neither of them have taken place. As a result, there is a widening gap between
rental value and real renting prices.
11
the dwelling is in the process to be rented or sold by showing that the price asked is
reasonable i.e. close to the rental value. Third, they can show the dwelling is not habitable
by providing a proof of the state of the dwelling.
Owners faced with the tax can react in multiple ways. On one side, they can decide
to do nothing and keep paying an increasing amount of the tax in subsequent periods.
Otherwise, they can decide to mobilise the dwelling which includes, offer the unit for sell
or rent, use it as a secondary residence or give it to a family member. Shifting the unit to a
secondary residence is the most costly option since the dwellings have to be furnished and
the owners have to start paying the TH for secondary homes, which as stated before, is
higher than for primary residences. Therefore, the system of incentives of taxes on housing
was changed when the TLV was introduced in a way that owners were encouraged to move
their dwellings out of vacancy while keeping the swift to secondary residences as the most
costly option.
In 2006 a new tax was implemented, the Taxe d’Habitation sur les Logement Vacants
or THLV that allowed the rest of the municipalities to vote the implementation of the tax
in the municipal council. Contrary to the TLV, the THLV only concerned those dwellings
that have been vacant for more than five years (instead of two for the TLV) and the tax
rate is decided at the municipality level (the average is 10%). Given that the THLV applies
to dwellings and charges a lower tax rate, only municipalities where TLV was not in place
could choose to introduce THLV.
Finally, in 2013, the TLV was reinforced with an increase in the tax rate (to 12,5% of
the rental value for the first year and 25% for the second year and onwards) and the reduc-
tion of the threshold for compulsory implementation from 200,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. A
second decree was published with the list of the municipalities where the implementation
of the TLV was compulsory. It included 1151 municipalities from 28 urban units. The
period of vacancy accepted before paying the tax was as well reduced from two to one
year.
4 Data
I exploit the fiscal data-set FILOCOM (FIchier des LOgements par COMmune)
containing information on the payments of the Taxe d’Habitation (TH) for every dwelling
in metropolitan France from 1995 to 2005. The data-set consists of around 30 million
observations per year distributed in 36,170 municipalities. For the analysis I aggregate the
data at the municipality level. 12
FILOCOM is available from 1995 to 2013, every odd year. However, I only use it
up to 2005 because in 2006 there was an extension of the tax (THLV) and in 2007 the
beginning of the financial crisis which could blur my results. This data-set, created by the
General Direction of Public Finances (DGFIP), contains information on the characteristics
of the housing stock (surface, level of comfort, building characteristics), on household’s
characteristics (income, household’s size, age of the members) and on the status, the mode
and the length of occupation and vacancy. The variable status of occupation classifies
dwellings into three categories according to usage: inhabited by the owners, inhabited by
renters — either in private, collective or social housing regime — or others uses — such
12Unfortunately, I cannot use panel data at the housing unit because observations do not have an
identifier and hence it is impossible to track them over time.
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as free occupancy or rural lease —. There is also a variable that allows us to identify
three13 categories of occupancy (primary residence, secondary home or vacant). Even if
only primary and secondary homes pay the TH, vacant dwellings are still kept in the data-
set. Other interesting variables are the length of occupancy (or vacancy) and the rental
value, which is the tax base for both the TH and the vacancy tax (TLV). Nevertheless,
one needs to be cautious when evaluating the rental value since there is a widening gap
between rental value and real renting prices.14
The status of vacancy is measured in FILOCOM according to the situation of the
dwelling on the 1st of January of a given year. This is, if an dwelling was non-occupied and
empty of furniture on the 1st of January 1997 it did not pay the TH in 1997 and hence is
considered as vacant. Then, the vacancy rate is computed by dividing the total number of
vacant dwellings in a municipality over the total number of dwellings in such municipality.
It is important to notice that not all vacant dwellings are subject to the tax, only those
that have been vacant for at least two years. Given that social housing institutions (HLM
and SEM in the French government’s terminology) are not subject to the TLV, I do not
consider the vacancy on the social sector. Hence, the outcome of interest will be the private
vacancy rate.
I also use other data-sets from INSEE for the basic characteristics of a municipality.
Namely, population census, growth and density are going to be used as controls for the
regression models. Data on prices comes from the Chamber of Notaries of France.
5 Empirical Strategy
I implement a Difference-in-Difference (DID) estimation strategy exploiting the fact
that not all the municipalities were subject to the tax in 1999. The DID strategy is a mean
comparison design that consists in creating a counterfactual outcome for the treatment
group using the outcome of the control group (Lechner et al., 2011).
The treatment group for the DID approach includes all taxed municipalities, those
that belonged to urban units of more than 200,000 inhabitants in 1999 and with a significant
imbalance between housing supply and demand. The group of urban units was chosen by
the central government and the tax was imposed into the local authorities, which had no
decision power in the implementation nor on the choice of the tax rate. Hence, one should
not be concerned about municipalities selecting themselves into or out of the treatment
group. In total, 672 urban municipalities, belonging to 7 urban units (metropolitan areas)
were taxed. For the treatment group, I use 300 municipalities, from 6 urban units because
I exclude the urban unit of Paris (region of Île-de-France).15 Indeed, Île-de-France has a
very unique housing market as far as demand pressure and prices are concerned. Keeping it
in the sample would make the common trend assumption less believable since the evolution
of market prices and housing variables in Île-de-France can very well be affected differently
13There is actually a forth category as well that includes part of commercial properties which are partially
accommodated to live, they represent less than 0.5% of the sample and are therefore excluded from the
sample.
14See footnote 11
15Given that housing market in the region of Île-de-France is under much more pressure than the rest
of the country, I exclude it from the sample. Such higher pressure can be observed in average price per
square-meter, which is as high as 5,470e/m2 for Île-de-France while roughly around 3,000e/m2 for the rest
of large cities (3,210e/m2 in Lyon and Toulouse, 2,930e/m2 in Bordeaux, 3,070e/m2 in Lille and around
2,500e/m2 in Marseilles, Nantes and Rennes) (Chambre de Notaires de Paris, June 2013.)
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by external factors and hence, experience a trend in outcomes different from the one in
other French cities. Although removing Île-de-France implies a reduction of the treatment
group by half (to 300 municipalities instead of 672) results are still significant since the
sample is large enough. In fact, this exclusion does not change the magnitude nor the
significance of the coefficients in any of the results tables (see Table A3 in Appendix 2).
It only changes the placebo test coefficients that become positive and significant in one of
the specifications, which indicates that indeed the treatment group including Paris could
have experienced a different trend than the control group.
Figure 4: Distribution of treatment and control urban areas across France
Notes: Blue areas represent urban units with the tax (treated) and orange areas urban units without the
tax (control).
Figure 4, shows the distribution of treatment and control urban units across the
country. It can be seen that the sample is made of urban units spread among all the
country. Most regions have either treatment or control urban units and only three of them
— Nord Pas de Calais, Rhône-Alpes and Provence-Alpes Côte-d’Azur — have both.
As for the control group I use the rest of the municipalities belonging as well to urban
units of more than 200,000 inhabitants but that according to the central government did
not have a substantially large enough “disequilibrium between supply and demand” and
hence, were not affected by the tax on vacancy. In this group there are 623 municipalities
belonging to the other 23 urban units of more than 200,000 inhabitants.16
Even though the context of the implementation of the TLV could look like the optimal
context for a Regression Discontinuity Design, it is actually not the case. First of all, it
would require taking the analysis at the unit urban level which would substantially decrease
16This includes Avignon, Béthune, Saint-Etienne, Metz, Douai-Lens, Toulon, Marseille-Aix-en-Provence,
Dijon, Brest, Rennes, Tours, Grenoble, Nantes, Orléans, Angers, Reims, Nancy, Valenciennes, Clermont-
Ferrand, Strasbourg, Mulhouse, Le Havre and Rouen.
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observations (only 7 urban areas were taxed). Secondly, the forcing variable, in this case,
population at the urban area is not continuous around the 200,000 threshold. There are 8
urban areas between 150,000 and 200,000 inhabitants and 6 between 200,000 and 250,000.
Thirdly, the threshold is not binding to the treatment assignment, which would require a
fuzzy RDD strategy, but most importantly, none of the urban areas right after the threshold
is treated. Actually, the first treated urban area had 290,000 inhabitants. These issues
make the implementation of an RDD strategy not feasible.17
The main advantage of the DID strategy is that it allows for the two groups to
start from a different level of outcome as long as they experienced a similar change over
time in the absence of the treatment. The DID strategy relies on one very important
assumption: the common trend assumption. It implies that both groups, conditional on
observables, should have experienced the same trend on the outcome variables had there
been no treatment. Hence, if the common trend assumption holds, any deviation of the
trend of the treated group from the trend of the non-treated can be directly attributed to
the effect of the treatment.
(15) E[V0t′ − V0t | TLV = 0] = E[V0t′ − V0t | TLV = 1].
In other words, the evolution of the vacancy rate in the treatment group – right part
of equation 15 – would have been the same than the one in the control group had it not
been treated. Moreover, I also need to assume that the treatment had no effect whatsoever
before its introduction (or announcement). This is indeed plausible in this case, since the
owners of vacant dwellings could not have predicted the approval of the tax before its
announcement in 1998.
As for the choice of the time period, ideally, one would like to have information from
the point immediately before any sort of treatment and then compare it with a point in
time when the tax is already in place. In the data-set, I have two points in time before
the implementation: 1995 and 1997. Technically, data from 1999 contains information
on the very first day of the implementation of the tax, January 1st, 1999. Consequently,
it is ambiguous whether the point 1999 should be considered as pre- or post- treatment.
Moreover, given that the tax was already announced in July 1998, it would be reasonable
to expect some anticipation from the households. This is, some households might have
been affected by the tax even before its implementation and might have changed their
behaviour already during the second half of 1998. Ideally, I would like to use 1998 as a
pre-treatment point but since data is only available every odd year, I use 1997 instead.
This way, I make sure I am capturing the entire effect of the tax (anticipation and direct
effect) while I still have two periods before the implementation of the law to check the
common trend assumption.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of vacancy rate for taxed municipalities (in blue) and
for non-taxed ones (in red). First, one can notice that the starting level of vacancy in 1995
for the treatment group is higher than in the control group, which could justify the choice
made by the French administration when determining the municipalities with a “higher
disequilibrium between supply and demand”. Secondly, it can be seen that the vacancy
rate decreases only slightly for non-taxed municipalities, less than 0.5 percentage points
17I tried also a geographical selection of treatment and control by selecting the municipalities just outside
of taxed urban units. The issue with this strategy is that control municipalities were generally more rural
and differed much more with the treatment ones than when using a DID strategy.
15
Figure 5: Evolution of vacancy rate
5
6
7
Va
ca
nc
y 
Ra
te
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Taxed Non−Taxed
Notes: This graph displays the mean of the vacancy rate for taxed and non-taxed municipalities. Each
observation has a weight of 1 (weighted results are available under demand). Taxed municipalities include
all taxed urban units except Paris (300 municipalities in 6 urban units). Control municipalities include
623 municipalities in 23 urban units. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1995 to 2005.
in a 10-years period whereas it decreases significantly in taxed municipalities, going from
6.5% to 5%, and reaching a level below the control group. The gray dashed line indicates
when the tax was officially implemented and the green vertical lines, the pre and the post
time points compared, 1997 versus 2001.
Figure 5 also allows to visually check the common trend assumption by looking at the
slope of the outcome between 1995 and 1997. The trends for the treated and the control
group are both slightly decreasing and almost parallel, which makes the common trend
assumption fairly plausible. At worst, the fact that the treatment group is decreasing less
then the control group could lead to an underestimation of the true effect, which would
make the estimates a lower bound.
Even if the pre-trends look fairly similar, the two groups may still systematically differ
due to the discretionary nature of the selection rule applied by the government. Indeed, the
descriptive statistics displayed in Table 1, show that most of the observable characteristics
(except private vacancy rate and total population) are statistically different in the two
groups. Treatment municipalities tend to have a higher vacancy rate, higher average income
and be under higher demographic pressure. Despite not being a required assumption for
the DID model, the fact that the groups were different before the implementation of the
tax makes the common trend assumption slightly less plausible. Specially, the differential
trends in population growth might be an underlying sign of differential trends in economic
factors. Hence, I tackle this issue first by including controls and control-specific time
trends and after by combining the DID strategy with a Propensity-Score Matching strategy,
which weights observations in the treatment and the control group according to observable
characteristics. I further address the question of selection of the treatment group in the
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Robustness Test section.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 1997
Taxed Non-Taxed
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Difference t-value p-value
Vacancy Rate 6.32 3.18 5.87 2.88 -0.45 2.14 0.03
Private Vacancy Rate 6.39 3.25 6.05 2.99 -0.34 1.54 0.12
Av. Income (e/year) 22,463 5,587 19,027 5,427 -3,435 8.92 0.00
Population 15,485 42,171 13,090 40,436 -2,395 0.83 0.41
Population Growth 7.3 11.86 3.96 9.06 -3.34 4.73 0.00
Density 1,194 1,499 918 985 -276 3.33 0.00
Rental Value (e) 18,200 5,055 15,156 4,487 -3,044 9.26 0.00
Surface (m2) 90.24 13.71 84.63 11.40 -5.61 6.55 0.00
Primary Residence 89.21 9.81 91.60 5.83 2.39 -4.62 0.00
Social Housing 10.36 12.40 12.86 11.93 2.50 -2.95 0.00
Notes: Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for year 1997 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic charac-
teristics of the municipalities. Treatment group has 300 observations while Control group has 623.
For that purpose, I first estimate the probability of having been assigned to the tax
as a function of a set of observable variables with a Probit Model (equation 16) and obtain
a propensity score for each observation. The variables that I use to estimate the model
are total population and density, average yearly income of the household, average surface,
percentage of social housing, the initial level of vacancy in 1997, the initial level of rental
value, the proportion of primary residences and the population growth between 1990 and
1997.
(16) PS(TLVm = 1|Xm) = Φ(βXm).
For the matching strategy to be valid I need to check that there is Common Support,
meaning that for each level of X there is a positive probability of being assigned to treatment
(equation 17).
(17) 0 < PS(TLVm) < 1.
Figure A6 in Appendix 2 shows that for each observation in the treatment group
there is at least one in the control group with a similar level of propensity score. Hence, I
do not have to remove any observation of the sample to ensure a common support.
Then I match observations according to their propensity score using the Kernel
method, which matches observations in the treatment group to a weighted average of the
observations in the control group. Weights depend on the distance between observations
with respect to propensity score, the closer, the higher the weight. The main advantage
of using a Kernel method is that all observations are used, which reduces the variance of
the estimators. Figure A7 in the Appendix 2 shows the evolution of vacancy weighted by
the Propensity Score. It shows that while trends were parallel before the treatment, the
introduction of the tax caused a negative change in the trend of the vacancy rate of taxed
municipalities.
Finally, I perform another test to check that the matching strategy has been ap-
propriately computed. In particular, I want to make sure that the Kernel algorithm has
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Table 2: Balancing Test for the covariates
Unmatched
/Matched Mean T Mean C Difference t-value p-value
Vacancy Rate U 6.32 5.87 0.45 2.14 0.03**
M 6.32 5.91 0.40 1.53 0.13
Private Vacancy Rate U 6.39 6.05 0.33 1.54 0.12
M 6.39 6.04 0.35 1.29 0.20
Av. Income (e/year) U 22,463 19,027 3,436 8.92 0.00***
M 22,463 23,488 -1,025 -1.91 0.06*
Population U 15,485 13,090 2,395 0.83 0.41
M 15,485 13,669 1,816 0.60 0.55
Population Growth U 7,30 3,96 3,34 4,73 0.00***
M 7,30 7,29 -0,01 -0.00 0,99
Density U 1.194 918 276 3.33 0.00***
M 1.194 1.099 95 0.80 0.43
Rental Value U 2,775 2,310 464 9.26 0.00***
M 2,775 2,832 -58.4 -0.86 0.39
Surface (m2) U 90.24 84.63 5.61 6.55 0.00***
M 90.24 91.74 -1.50 -1.21 0.23
Primary Residence U 89.21 91.60 -2.39 -4.62 0.00***
M 89.21 90.19 -0.98 -1.38 0.17
Social Housing U 10.36 12.86 -2.50 -2.95 0.00***
M 10.36 10.16 0.20 0.21 0.84
Notes: The unmatched rows provide the means for the treatment and the control group as in Table 1.
The matched rows take into account the matching weight for the control group. Data comes from FILO-
COM data-set for year 1997 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic characteristics of the municipalities.
Treatment group has 300 observations while Control group has 623.
weighted observations in a way that descriptive statistics of the resulting groups are similar
to each other. For that purpose, I report in Table 2 the balancing test for the matching
strategy. I report as well the p-value resulting from a means different t-test between the
two groups both for the unmatched and the matched sample. It can be seen, that once the
matching is performed, the treatment and control group are much more similar in terms
of descriptive statistics. All means appear to be not statistically significant between treat-
ment and control once the matching is applied, except for some statistically differences in
the average income. Therefore, differential trends in population growth are no longer an
issue with the DID Matching given that the two groups have now non-significantly different
levels of population growth.
In the traditional DID model one would regress the outcome to a treatment dummy,
a dummy indicating the time (before or after the treatment) and the interaction of these
two. However, I need to use the first difference of the outcome to implement the matching
strategy, since it does not allow for interaction terms. Hence, to be consistent with the
matching strategy I implement the simple DID using as well the first difference of the out-
come and regressing it against a treatment dummy and the first difference of the controls.
This is identical to the implementation of the traditional DID with individual fixed effects.
Formally, the model I estimate is:
(18) ∆Vm,t = δTLVm + γ1∆Xm,t + εmt
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where Vm,t is the ratio of vacant dwellings over the total stock of housing defined in
municipality m at time t, TLVm is a dummy equal to 1 if the municipality was concerned
by the tax and zero otherwise, Xm,t is a vector of time changing housing and demographic
characteristics at the municipality level and εmt is the error term. I use the first difference
of the vacancy rate and of the controls, where t − 1 represents the period before the
implementation of the tax and t the moment where the tax is in place. The use of the first
difference allows us to cancel out the effect of all time invariant characteristics, hence I only
need to control for the variables that change over time. In further regressions I use also
the difference in the outcome for subsequent years to see the yearly effect of belonging to
the taxed group up to 6 years after its implementation. In some specifications, I estimate
equation 19 which includes a specific time trend for each covariate (γ2Xm,t−1).
(19) ∆Vm,t = δTLVm + γ1∆Xm,t + γ2Xm,t−1 + εmt
I include all observable variables that could lead to a differential time trend. This is,
I have selected the covariates X whose evolution differed between treatment and control. I
include a group of demographic variables such as total population and density and a group
of housing controls with the average yearly income of the household, the average surface
and the percentage of social housing.
Given that observations are grouped into 29 different urban units, it is reasonable to
think that municipalities are not independent from one another. Hence, standard errors
are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level.18
6 Results
Table 3 presents the main results of the DID strategy of the effect of the TLV on
the private vacancy rate, two years after its implementation. It is the result of estimating
equation 18 and 19. I compare the number of vacant dwellings over the total stock of
housing for taxed and non-taxed municipalities in 1997 and 2001. Columns (1) to (4)
report four different OLS specifications while columns (5) and (6) report the matching
results.
Column (1) is the direct DID estimator without any other controls, in column (2),
I include the two sets of controls described above (housing and demographic controls). In
column (3) I add specific time trends for all baseline characteristics. and in column (4) I
check the heterogeneous effects according to the initial level of vacancy.19. This means, I
include a dummy for high initial vacancy rate and I interact it with the treatment.20 The
coefficient TLV represents the average impact of the tax on those municipalities where
TLV was implemented. Columns (5) and (6) present two matching regressions that differ
in the way propensity score is estimated. In column (5) I use housing and demographic
controls and in column (6) I add the previous trend of the vacancy trend (between 1995
and 1997) to account for similarities between municipalities that are due to the pattern of
vacancy. The effect is negative and statistically significant in all specifications, both for the
18Given that the number of clusters is considerably low (30 urban units) a block bootstrapped treatment
of the standard errors is preferred to the standard clustering method.
19See Table A4 for the coefficients of each of the controls.
20HighVac equals 1 if vacancy rate is higher than 7.46%, which corresponds to the percentile 75 of the
distribution
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Table 3: Effect of TLV on vacancy rate, comparing 1997 to 2001
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLV -0.910∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.310∗ -0.745∗∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.136) (0.136) (0.188) (0.140) (0.143)
HighVac 0.175
(0.202)
TLV*HighVac -0.694∗∗∗
(0.190)
Housing Controls X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X
Specific Time Trends X X
N 923 923 923 923 923 923
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each column represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate
as the dependent variable. Last two columns use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. Controls are included in
its first difference form. Specific time trends are the controls at the baseline level, 1997. For the matching
columns, the crosses indicate the variables that have been used for the matching procedure. Housing
controls include the average surface, the average yearly income of the household and the proportion of
social housing. Demographic controls include population and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference
in vacancy rate between 1995 and 1997. Specific time trend are for all the variables in controls plus the
population growth 90-97 and the initial level of vacancy. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years
1997 and 2001 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic characteristics of the municipalities. Treatment group
has 300 observations in 6 clusters while Control group has 623 in 23 clusters per year.
OLS and for matching. The resulting effect size is a reduction of 0.8 percentage points.21
Considering that the average vacancy rate for taxed municipalities in 1997 was 6.32% a
decrease of 0.8 percentage points is equivalent to a 13% reduction. In absolute terms,
there were 40,000 less vacant dwellings in treated municipalities than there would have
been without the implementation of the tax. These results confirm the model predictions
that a tax on vacancy decreases total level of vacancy, this is, the sum of vacant units on
the market plus inactive units.
The magnitude of the coefficient might seem surprising given the relatively small
tax payment associated with the TLV. However, there is accumulating evidence suggesting
that individuals are inattentive to some types of incentives (Chetty et al., 2009). In this
context, a tax on vacancy is more salient than the forgone revenue from renting a dwelling.
Hence the introduction of the tax changes the incentives of the owners not only by the tax
liability but also by making more salient the cost of keeping a property vacant.
In terms of policy implications it is interesting to look at the heterogeneity of the
effect with respect to the initial level of vacancy. I check for this in column (4) where
the interaction coefficient appears to be significant and negative. The magnitude of the
interaction is -0.7 which means that the effect of the tax is twice as high for cities with an
initially high level of vacancy.
21The effect of the tax is much higher if I weight municipalities by the number of housing units (see
table A5). Indeed, when accounting for the size of the city, the reduction of vacancy rate due to the TLV
equal 1 percentage points. This means that the tax was more effective in large cities.
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Table 7 provides the yearly effect of TLV taking 1995 as a reference year. Here, I
compute the first difference for every available year taking 1995 as a baseline. This allows
us to see how the vacancy rate changed in treatment versus in control municipalities every
period. Columns (1) to (3) report the impact of the tax on the difference in vacancy rate
for different periods in an OLS regression. Column (1) is the standard DID, in column (2)
I include the two groups of controls and in column (3) I include a specific trend for each
baseline characteristic. Columns (4) and (5) provide the results of the matching strategy.
Table 4: Vacancy rate, yearly effect
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TLV -0.056 -0.014 0.170 0.081 -0.036
95 - 97 (0.141) (0.133) (0.197) (0.118) (0.144)
TLV -0.519∗∗∗ -0.210 -0.077 -0.265∗ -0.338∗∗∗
95 - 99 (0.086) (0.143) (0.230) (0.154) (0.162)
TLV -0.966∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.778∗∗∗
95 - 01 (0.073) (0.146) (0.214) (0.181) (0.153)
TLV -1.348∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗ -1.012∗∗∗ -1.040∗∗∗
95 - 03 (0.175) (0.218) (0.312) (0.185) (0.158)
TLV -1.485∗∗∗ -1.032∗∗∗ -0.878∗∗∗ -1.269∗∗∗ -1.315∗∗∗
95 - 05 (0.116) (0.138) (0.285) (0.186) (0.178)
Housing Controls X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X
Specific Time Trends X
N 923 923 923 923 923
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each cell represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate as
the dependent variable. Last two columns use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. The numbers such as 95
- 97 indicate the years compared in the first difference. All controls are as well first differentiated. Specific
time trends are the controls at the baseline level, 1995. For the matching columns, the crosses indicate the
variables that have been used for the matching procedure. Housing controls include the average surface,
the average yearly income of the household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls
include population and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference in vacancy rate between 1995 and
1997. Specific time trend are for all the variables in controls plus the population growth 90-97 and the
initial level of vacancy. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1995 to 2005. Treatment group has
300 observations in 6 clusters while Control group has 623 in 23 clusters per year.
Coefficients of the variable TLV for the difference between 1995 and 1997 are not
significant. These results indicate that the vacancy rate did not evolve in a statistically
significant way for treated and non-treated municipalities before the implementation of the
tax. Therefore it can be interpreted as a placebo test of the common trend assumption.
Although the common trend assumption can never be really tested, the fact that the coef-
ficient of the difference in vacancy rate before the tax was implemented are not significant
indicates that the two groups evolved similarly before and hence suggest that they might
have evolve equally had the tax not been implemented.
As for the difference between 1995 and 1999, coefficients are already negative and
significant for some of the specifications. It suggests that there had been some anticipation
effects of the tax. In Figure 5, the anticipation effect can already be seen since the vacancy
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rate starts to decrease after 1997. Interestingly enough, there is also a decrease in non-
taxed municipalities, which could indicate an anticipation effect happened as well in the
control group, given that the list of concerned municipalities was not public until December
30th 1998. Nevertheless, results suggest that anticipation effect was stronger in treated
municipalities. One possible explanation is that very large urban units had a much higher
probability to be treated and hence reacted more strongly to the announcement of the tax.
Lastly, the coefficients for the difference with 2001, 2003 and 2005 are negative and
highly significant. The highest decrease occurred in 2001. The long term effect of the
tax can be observed with the interaction with 2005 and it is equivalent to a decrease of 1
percentage points of the vacancy rate.
As in the labor market there is a natural rate of unemployment, in the housing market
there is, likewise, a natural rate of vacancy (Wheaton, 1990). This means that there is an
incompressible level of vacancy that will never disappear due to market frictions. When
a dwelling becomes vacant, it is likely that it will remain vacant for at least a specific
period of time due to frictional costs. Although the existence of a natural rate is generally
accepted in the housing market literature, few are the estimations of its magnitude. There
is, however, a report by the Economics Affaires Commission of the French Senate that
reports a “generally accepted” rate of vacancy ranging between 4% and 5% (Cleach, 2003).
If I take this into account, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is very relevant since
such natural vacancy rate would have been reached by the treatment group in 2005.
7 Robustness Tests
Given that the government selected the municipalities to be taxed in a non-random
way, I provide a series of robustness test to show that the effect of the tax can nonetheless
be properly identified.
First of all, I restrict the sample to only those regions in France that have both taxed
and non taxed urban units. The reason of doing so responds to an effort to try to find two
comparison groups where the common trend assumption would be even more plausible.
Indeed, the fact that treatment and control urban units belong to a same region makes it
more likely that they will be affected in a similar way by external factors. There are only
three regions in France with treated and control urban units: Nord Pas de Calais, Rhone
Alpes and Provence Alpes Cote d’Azur.22
I provide the results in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the OLS regressions,
whose coefficients are statistically significant and remain of the same magnitude. Column
(3) reports the results of the Matching strategy, with a similar coefficient and the same
level of significance. This indicates that results are not driven by the differential location
of treated and control cities across regions.
In a second robustness test, I choose a different methodology to select the control
group to check the validity and magnitude of the coefficients. An alternative control
group can be constructed with urban municipalities that implemented the tax after the
first reform of the law in 2006. This reform allowed municipalities not concerned by the
22In Nord Pas de Calais there is one treated urban unit (Lille) and three control (Béthune, Douai-Lens
and Valenciennes). In Rhone Alpes there is also one treatment urban unit (Lyon) and two control (Saint-
Etienne and Grenoble). And finally, in Provence Alpes Cote d’Azur there are two treatment urban units
(one composed by Nice and Cannes altogether and Marseille) and three control urban units (Avignon,
Aix-en-Provence and Toulon)
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Table 5: Robustness Test: Testing the impact of TLV on different samples
Regions with both T and C units Adoption of THLV in 2008
OLS Matching OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLV -0.685∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗ -0.578∗∗∗ -0.883∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.158) (0.225) (0.126) (0.124) (0.127)
Housing Controls X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X X
Specific Time Trends X X
N 515 515 515 901 901 901
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis, for
OLS they are robust for columns 1 and 2 and block bootstrapped at the urban unit level for 4 and 5 (439
clusters per sample), for the Matching, they are bootstrapped. Each column represents a different regression
with first difference of the vacancy rate as the dependent variable (period 1997-2001). We use a propensity
score matching strategy to weight control observations. All controls are as well first differentiated. Variable
TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. Specific time trends are the controls at the
baseline level, 1997. For the matching columns, the crosses indicate the variables that have been used for
the matching procedure. Housing controls include the average surface, the average yearly income of the
household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls include population and density.
Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference in vacancy rate between 1995 and 1997. Specific time trend are for
all the variables in controls plus the population growth 90-97 and the initial level of vacancy. Data comes
from FILOCOM data-set for years 1997 and 2001 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic characteristics of
the municipalities.
TLV to vote and approve the THLV (a local tax on vacancy). In 2008, there were 1,938
municipalities that had adopted the tax among which 608 were in urban areas.
The idea behind this second choice of control group is that municipalities that im-
plemented the tax in 2008 may share some characteristics with the ones that were forced
to adopte it in 1999. It is likely that municipalities that adopted the tax were also experi-
menting a tight housing market. In fact, those cities had as well a high level of vacancy in
1999 (7.96%), which may explain why they implemented the tax when they were authorised
to do so.
When I replicate the results with this new choice of control group (Table 5 columns
4 to 6), we see that the coefficients TLV are significant and of a similar magnitude than in
my main estimation, both for the OLS and the matching strategy. Hence, this alternative
strategy shows that my results are not tied to the choice of the control group.
Thirdly, one could think that the reason why I find a significant effect of the tax is
because the group of municipalities that were taxed had a more dynamic housing market
right after the implementation of the tax. This would invalidate my empirical strategy
given that I would be unable to say whether the reduction of the vacancy rate was due to
the introduction of the tax or by the more active housing market.
In order to test this, I decomposed the vacancy rate according to its duration. I iden-
tify three categories: less than one year vacant, between one and two years and more than
two years, which represent, respectively 43%, 14% and 42% of total vacant apartments.23
If the group of tax municipalities had a more dynamic housing market we would expect
a decrease in vacancy, regardless of its duration. Conversely, knowing that when the tax
was first implemented it concerned solely those dwellings that had been vacant for at least
23A more detailed and continuous decomposition is not possible due to data constraints
23
two years, we would expect the third category to be the most affected by the introduction
of the tax.
Table 6: Effect of TLV on vacancy rate, results by duration
OLS Matching
Vacancy Rate < 1 year 1-2 years ≥ 2 years < 1 year 1-2 years ≥ 2 years
by Duration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TLV -0.171∗∗ -0.093 -0.376∗∗∗ -0.145 -0.157∗∗ -0.488∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.060) (0.061) (0.095) (0.067) (0.074)
Mean of C in 1997 2.62 0.86 2.57 2.62 0.86 2.57
Housing Controls X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X X X
N 923 923 923 923 923 923
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each column represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate
as the dependent variable. Last three columns use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. All controls are as well
first differentiated. For the matching columns, the crosses indicate the variables that have been used for
the matching procedure. Housing controls include the average surface, the average yearly income of the
household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls include population, population
growth 90-97 and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference in vacancy rate between 1995 and 1997.
Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1997 and 2001 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic
characteristics of the municipalities.
In table 6 we can see that, indeed, coefficients of columns (3) and (6) report a high,
negative and significant coefficient. As for the other categories of the matching strategy,
there is also a small and negative significant in column (5). In fact, short term vacancy
seems to have been as well somehow impacted by the tax through the mechanism of
anticipation. However, these results suggest that the tax did not decrease mobility in a
out of vacancy but was especially effective in reducing long term vacancy. The fact that only
targeted long-term vacancy decreased while short-term vacancy remained fairly constant
provides some evidence against the argument of the more dynamic housing market.24
Finally, I perform a last robustness test to further dissipate the endogeneity concerns
of the selection into treatment. So far, I was comparing a treatment and a control group
which, while they shared similar trends in housing market variables, they were in different
urban units. In an attempt to find two groups that are even closer to each other, I exploit
the exogeneity of the timing of the release of a new definition of the urban units with
respect to the timing of the tax, which allow us to identify control units that were not
treated but included in the same urban units than treated municipalities.
The French government used the 1990 definition of urban units to select the munic-
ipalities to be taxed on December 1998. Then, only a few months after the introduction
of the tax, the French Statistics Department released a document with the new compo-
sition of urban units. This new definition added 73 municipalities into the taxed urban
areas that were not included into the decree with the list of taxed municipalities. Hence,
the fact that these municipalities were not taxed is somehow random and only due to the
timing of the documents releases, which is not something that municipalities could have
24I perform a similar robustness test comparing social and private vacancy, see Section A in Appendix
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manipulated. This provides us a source of exogeneity and allows us to compare two groups
of municipalities that are more similar to each other, given that they all belonged to the
same urban unit.
I use these 73 municipalities and I compare them with a group of bordering taxed
municipalities (See Figure A9 for the example of Bordeaux). I select only those treated
municipalities that share a border with at least one of the 73 recently incorporated munic-
ipalities in order to make sure that the two groups are as similar as possible; this adds up
to 108 treated and bordering municipalities. In Table A6 I compare the characteristics of
treated and control municipalities in 1997 and we observe that at least half of the baseline
characteristics are not statistically significant any more. The two groups differ in terms of
population and average rental value but they started initially with similar vacancy rates
and average income.
Table 7: Effect of TLV on vacancy rate, bordering municipalities
OLS Matching
Vacancy Rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TLV -0.762∗∗∗ -0.389∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.531∗ -0.551∗
(0.238) (0.140) (0.137) (0.303) (0.310)
Housing Controls X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X
Specific Time Trends X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X
N 181 181 181 181 181
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (7 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each column represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate
as the dependent variable. Last two columns use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. All controls are as well
first differentiated. For the matching columns, the crosses indicate the variables that have been used for
the matching procedure. Housing controls include the average surface, the average yearly income of the
household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls include population, population
growth 90-97 and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference in vacancy rate between 1995 and 1997.
Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1997 and 2001 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic
characteristics of the municipalities.
Then, I apply the DID strategy on the new sample and provide the results in Table
7. The coefficient of the variable of interest is still significant in the OLS columns but lower
in magnitude. This might be due to the fact that tax is less effective in the surrounding
municipalities than in the center ones. For the matching strategy I find as well significant
coefficients although at the 10% significance level, most likely due to the sample size
reduction. Hence, the vacancy level of the periphery municipalities where the tax was
implemented was reduced by 0.5 percentage points more than in those other periphery
municipalities that were, by chance, not included into the list of taxed municipalities.
Given the geographic proximity of the municipalities in the treatment and in the
control group, one may worry about displacement effects. Notably, if owners affected by
the tax put their dwellings to rent, this may attract renters from neighbour municipalities
and hence the impact I identify may be just due to displacement of the renters. I show in
Figure A9 that the vacancy rate of the control municipalities has not increased due to the
tax and therefore, the effect that I identify does not seem to be driven by displacement
25
effects.
Through the use of this strategy I compare yet another control group to a very similar
group of taxed municipalities to find similar, although slightly lower coefficients, as I can
only estimate a local effect in the periphery of urban units. Hence, this robustness test is
another confirmation of the main results.
8 Understanding the effect of TLV
So far, I have attempted to assess the first direct effect of TLV after its implementa-
tion in 1999. I find that there is a strong, negative and significant effect of the tax on the
vacancy rate. The assessment of the direct effect is a first and necessary step to investigate
the role of fiscal policies on housing outcomes. Now, I am interested in the effect of the
tax on different outcomes.
Firstly, I aim to assess how have the two complementary status of vacancy evolved
due to this decrease in vacancy. This is, has it translated into an increase of the primary
residence ratio or in the secondary residence ratio25? One could think that owners can
have interest to act strategically by transferring vacant dwellings into secondary residences
in order to keep them at their disposal and avoid renting or selling. To do so, they need
to furnish them and to pay the Habitation Tax (TH). Hence, the decision of moving the
dwelling away from vacancy depends on the relative cost of the TH compared to the TLV.
Given that average tax rate of TH for treated municipalities is 14.5%, it is only inferior
to TLV for those dwellings that have been vacant for five or more years, for which the tax
rate is 15%. Therefore, such a strategic behaviour is only optimal for those dwellings in
long term vacancy.26
In Table 8 I look at what happened with the primary and the secondary residence
ratio (columns 3 to 6), we see that the entire decrease in vacancy seems to be translated
into an increase in primary residence ratio, for both the short and the long term effects.
However, the secondary residence ratio is also somehow affected by the tax; see columns
(5) and (6). These results show that there was indeed some strategic behaviour in shift-
ing dwellings to secondary residences. Appendix Figure A10 plots the evolution of the
two ratios; it can be seen that the common trend assumption hold as well for these two
outcomes.
Secondly, I look at the impact of the tax on other housing market outcomes. Accord-
ing to the model in Section 2, we would expect an increase in the active housing stock right
after the implementation of the tax due to the higher mobilisation of the current stock. As
a consequence, rents should decrease at the short term if the volume of mobilised housing
stock is high enough. On the contrary, in the long term, since the cost of investment has
increased due to the tax we could expect a reduction in investment and hence an increase
in rents. To assess the theoretical predictions one can look at three different outcomes:
prices (due to data constrains, I cannot look at rents), a measure of mobility and rate of
25It is also important to consider the possibility of demolition. The French Ministry of Housing has
computed an approximate figure of the dwellings that have been destroyed using the FILOCOM database.
In a 10-years period, from 1999 to 2009 the rate of disappearance has been estimated to be around 1%,
i.e. 0.1% per year in average. Hence, this possibility can be deemed negligible for the analysis.
26I would like to test for heterogeneous effects by the different tax rates of TH with respect to the fixed
tax rate of TLV, however, I only have data at the municipality level from 2002 onward. Even though we
would not expect the tax rate of TH to change a lot from one year to the other, it could be the case that
municipalities who got taxed behaved in a different way as far as the tax rates of the TH are concerned.
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new construction.27
When I assess the impact on prices I find no significant effect for the short term
and a positive and significant effect in the long term (see columns (7) and (8) of Table 8).
If we apply the same theoretical predictions for rents to prices, which is not necessarily
appropriate, my results would be contradicting the theory. However, several factors could
explain the lack of a negative effect in prices in the short term. First, the mobilisation of
the current stock due to the tax may not have been high enough to affect prices. Second,
the mobilised stock could have been offered for sale or for rent which would reduce even
more the intensity of the shock in both markets. Third, an effect on prices could occur at
a very local level. If this is the case, I would not be able to capture this effect since the
data is observed at the municipality level.
As for the long term impact in prices, I do find a positive impact although this effect
does not seem to be driven by the shrunk of the supply. Indeed, we see in columns (11) and
(12) that the rate of new construction was not statistically different in the treatment than
in the control group, neither in 2001 nor in 2005. Hence, six years after the implementation
of the tax, housing supply does not seem to have shrunk. This result could be explained
by the fact that the tax was implemented in dense urban units where land is scarce and
hence possibilities for new construction are low. The long term positive impact on prices
might also be capturing other confounding factors.
To measure mobility, I use the proportion of ownership changes over all dwellings.
This measure includes dwellings that have been sold but also any kind of transfer or
donation implying a change in name on the ownership documents. Hence, it is not a perfect
measure of mobility as it includes transfers that do not imply a market transaction. I find
a positive and significant coefficient, columns (9) and (10) which is higher in the short
term. This suggests that, as theory would predict, there is more mobility in the housing
market after the implementation of the tax.
Finally, I would like to identify the composition effects of the tax. This means,
to identify who benefited from the tax on vacancy and who occupied the formerly vacant
dwellings. Given data constraints, I can only look at aggregated measures28 of welfare such
as average yearly income of the household or income distribution (income of the bottom
20, or bottom 40). However, these effects are challenged by identification issues if the
assessment is not done at a very small level of observation. In the data, I do not find any
significant effect of the tax on those measures.29 A more detailed and local analysis is
needed to be able to draw conclusions about the total welfare effects of the tax on vacancy.
27Unfortunately, I cannot test the common trend assumption for these three outcomes since data only
starts at 1997.
28Our dataset is not a panel at the housing unit level but at the municipality level
29I also look at other variables such as household size, proportion of tenants or concentration of vacancy
and I find no effect. Results are available upon request
27
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9 Conclusion
In well-functioning urban housing markets, vacancy can occur due to frictions in the
searching process or due to voluntary withholding of housing units. In large cities, where
the demand pressure on the housing market is high, vacancy can be seen as problematic
as it implies an inefficient use of the housing stock. Policy makers have historically tried
to reduce vacancy through different instruments in order to improve housing affordability
in cities. This paper is the first attempt to rigorously evaluate the impact of one of this
instruments: a tax on vacant housing.
I assess the context of France, where a vacancy tax was implemented in some mu-
nicipalities in 1999. The setting of the implementation of the tax in a subgroup of mu-
nicipalities allows for a clean identification of a treatment and a control group, which are
then compared using a Difference-in-Difference approach combined with a Propensity Score
Matching. I find that the introduction of the tax represented a decrease of 0.8 percentage
points of the vacancy rate for treated municipalities with respect to control ones. In other
words, in a four years period vacancy rate was reduced by 13% in taxed municipalities.
The effect is higher in municipalities with an initially higher level of vacancy. Results
are robust across specifications, sample reduction and choice of control group. The tax
seems to have been especially effective in reducing long term vacancy. Finally, my results
also suggest that most of the vacant dwellings moved to primary residences while there is
some evidence suggesting a strategic behaviour of moving vacancy dwellings into secondary
residences.
I contribute to the literature on the role of fiscal policies in the housing market by
providing evidence of the direct effect of taxing vacancy. While I have managed to shed
light on the main starting question, many new interesting questions have arisen during the
course of the evaluation whose answers would provide a better understanding of the effect.
There is still a need for further research to continue investigating about the implications
of housing policies. To name a few issues, future investigation could help determine to
what extent tenant protection can be identified as a source of vacancy. Similarly, further
empirical research could be useful to better identify the beneficiaries of the tax and draw
conclusion about the total welfare effect of the tax.
In terms of policy implications, these results indicate that a municipal tax on vacancy
can indeed influence the behaviour of owners of vacant dwellings. While it might not be the
best instrument to collect public revenues, it does play a role in shaping the incentives in
the housing market. Given that the tenancy protection system and the legal environment
of the housing market in France is, in general, not very different from other countries
in Europe, like Germany or Switzerland, we could think about the tax on vacancy as a
potential public tool to be used in other contexts.
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Appendices
A Appendix 1: Additional Robustness Tests
We perform another falsification test using social vacancy as an outcome of the
regression. Given that the institutions that provide social housing were not concerned by
the vacancy tax, we would not expect social vacancy to be affected by the introduction of
the tax. In table A1 we can see that the coefficient of TLV, even if it is negative and of
a similar magnitude, is not significant for social vacancy. The number of observations is
lower for social vacancy due to missing information, hence, we drop the same observations
for the private vacancy for a matter or comparison. We do that to show that even with the
sample reduction the coefficients of private vacancy are still significant while the coefficients
of social vacancy are not. Here again, if the two groups were intrinsically different in terms
of housing market, in the sense that the treatment group had a more dynamic trend
during the period of the implementation, we would see such pressure reflected also on the
social vacancy rate. Not having significant coefficients for social vacancy, undermines this
argument.
Table A1: Effect of TLV on vacancy rate, results by type of ownership
Private Vacancy Social Vacancy
OLS Matching OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLV -0.640∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗ -0.179 -0.465 -0.598
(0.136) (0.150) (0.162) (0.761) (0.846) (0.961)
Mean of C in 1997 6.12 5.44
Housing Controls X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X X
Specific Time Trends X X
N 923 923 923 923 923 923
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each column represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate as
the dependent variable. Columns (3) and (6) use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. All controls are as well
first differentiated. For the matching columns, the crosses indicate the variables that have been used for
the matching procedure. Housing controls include the average surface, the average yearly income of the
household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls include population, population
growth 90-97 and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference in vacancy rate between 1995 and 1997.
Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1997 and 2001 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic
characteristics of the municipalities. Treatment group has 300 observations in 6 clusters while Control
group has 623 in 23 clusters per year.
Similarly, we want to test that our results are not affected by another law that
was passed during the same period. This law imposed municipalities of more than 3,500
inhabitants to have at least 20% of social housing (Law SRU for its initials in French).
While this law encouraged local governments to build more social housing, it did not set
any rule regarding the level of occupation. Yet, occupation in social housing may still
have been affected by SRU. This however does not invalidate our previous falsification
test because the group of municipalities concerned by SRU differs from the municipalities
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affected by TLV (50% and 40% in the treatment and the control group respectively).
We test that the simultaneous implementation of the two laws (TLV and SRU) does not
challenge our results by adding in our regression a dummy for whether the municipality
was affected by SRU and its interaction with the proportion of social housing. Results
remain unaffected by this inclusion both in terms of magnitude and significance. They can
be seen in Table A2.
Table A2: Testing the effect of Loi SRU
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TLV -0.910∗∗∗ -0.660∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗ -0.583∗∗
(0.061) (0.095) (0.217) (0.235)
SRU -0.106 0.038 -0.172 -0.358
(0.104) (0.139) (0.179) (0.287)
Tax*SRU 0.105 0.024 0.082 0.232
(0.228) (0.243) (0.296) (0.411)
% Social 0.000
(0.000)
TLV*Social -0.003
(0.010)
Tax*SRU*Social -0.011
(0.018)
Housing Controls X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Specific Time Trends X X
N 923 923 923 923
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis, they
are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters). Each column represents a different regression
with the first difference of the vacancy rate as the dependent variable. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed
municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. Variable SRU equals 1 if the municipality is concerned by the law
and 0 otherwise. Social is the percentage of social housing. All controls are as well first differentiated.
Specific time trends are the controls at the baseline level, 1997. Housing controls include average surface,
the average yearly income of the household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls
include population and density. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1997 and 2001 plus INSEE
data-sets on demographic characteristics of the municipalities.
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B Appendix 2: Additional Tables and Figures
Figure A6: Common Support
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Notes: This graph plots the frequency of municipalities according to the estimated propensity score. Data
comes from FILOCOM data-set for year 1997.
Figure A7: Evolution of vacancy rate weighted by PS
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Notes: This graph displays the mean of the vacancy rate for taxed and non-taxed municipalities weighted
by population. Taxed municipalities include all taxed urban units except Paris (299 municipalities in
6 urban units). Control municipalities include 623 municipalities in 23 urban units. Data comes from
FILOCOM data-set for years 1995 to 2005.
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Figure A8: Urban Unit of Bordeaux
Figure A9: Evolution of vacancy rate in Bordering Municipalities
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Notes: This graph displays the mean of the vacancy rate for taxed and non-taxed municipalities. Taxed
municipalities include 106 municipalities. Control municipalities include 73 municipalities. Data comes
from FILOCOM data-set for years 1995 to 2005.
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Figure A10: Evolution of primary and secondary residence ratios
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Notes: This graph displays the mean of the primary residence ratio and the secondary residence ratio for
taxed and non-taxed municipalities. Taxed municipalities include all taxed urban units except Paris (299
municipalities in 6 urban units). Control municipalities include 623 municipalities in 23 urban units. Data
comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1995 to 2005.
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Table A3: Robustness Test: Yearly effect without excluding Paris urban unit
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TLV 0.108 0.142 0.297∗ 0.077 -0.075
95 - 97 (0.148) (0.151) (0.174) (0.157) (0.172)
TLV -0.192 0.056 0.192 -0.166 -0.289
95 - 99 (0.227) (0.251) (0.285) (0.203) (0.222)
TLV -0.726∗∗∗ -0.382∗ -0.229 -0.666∗∗∗ -0.734∗∗∗
95 - 01 (0.157) (0.201) (0.252) (0.217) (0.215)
TLV -1.354∗∗∗ -0.911∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗ -1.292∗∗∗ -1.328∗∗∗
95 - 03 (0.110) (0.208) (0.270) (0.228) (0.217)
TLV -1.585∗∗∗ -1.142∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗ -1.817∗∗∗ -1.839∗∗∗
95 - 05 (0.106) (0.199) (0.243) (0.212) (0.268)
Housing Controls X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X
Linear Time Trend X
N 1295 1295 1295 1295 1295
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (30 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each cell represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate as
the dependent variable. Last two columns use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. The numbers such as 95
- 97 indicate the years compared in the first difference. All controls are as well first differentiated. Specific
time trends are the controls at the baseline level, 1995. For the matching columns, the crosses indicate the
variables that have been used for the matching procedure.Housing controls include the average surface,
the average yearly income of the household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls
include population and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference in vacancy rate between 1995 and
1997. Specific time trend are for all the variables in controls plus the population growth 90-97 and the
initial level of vacancy. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1995 to 2005. Treatment group has
672 observations in 7 clusters while Control group has 623 in 23 clusters per year.
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Table A4: Effect of TLV on vacancy rate, comparing 1997 to 2001
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TLV -0.910∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗ -0.799∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.136) (0.148) (0.172) (0.146) (0.147)
HighVac 0.051
(0.203)
TLV*HighVac -0.738∗∗∗
(0.207)
∆ Av. Income 0.001∗ -0.0001 -0.0001
(in hundreds) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Surface -0.136∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.029) (0.030)
∆ Population 0.005 0.004 0.005
(in hundreds) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
∆ Population Density -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆ Social Housing 0.023 -0.008 -0.013
(0.048) (0.051) (0.053)
Av. IncomeTrend -0.153 -0.132
(in ten thousands) (0.169) (0.184)
Surface Trend 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
Pop. Growth Trend -0.002 -0.003
(0.007) (0.006)
Population Trend 0.005∗ 0.004
(in thousands) (0.003) (0.003)
Density Trend 0.006 0.007
(in hundreds) (0.006) (0.006)
Rental Value Trend 0.076 -0.104
(in hundreds) (0.093) (0.109)
Social Housing Trend 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.005)
Vacancy Rate Trend -0.208∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.048)
Housing Controls X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X
Specific Time Trends X X
N 923 923 923 923 923 923
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each column represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate
as the dependent variable. Last two columns use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. Controls are included in
its first difference form. Specific time trends are the controls at the baseline level, 1997. For the matching
columns, the crosses indicate the variables that have been used for the matching procedure. Housing
controls include the average surface, the average yearly income of the household and the proportion of
social housing. Demographic controls include population and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference
in vacancy rate between 1995 and 1997. Specific time trend are for all the variables in controls plus the
population growth 90-97 and the initial level of vacancy. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years
1997 and 2001 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic characteristics of the municipalities.
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Table A5: Effect of TLV on vacancy rate, weighted vacancy
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TLV -1.303∗∗∗ -1.040∗∗∗ -1.087∗∗∗ -0.607∗∗∗
(0.323) (0.302) (0.228) (0.204)
HighVac -0.277
(0.293)
TLV*HighVac -1.075∗∗
(0.382)
Housing Controls X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Specific Time Trends X X
N 923 923 923 923
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis, they
are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters). Each column represents a different regression
with the first difference of the vacancy rate as the dependent variable. All regressions are weighted by the
number of housing units. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. All controls
are as well first differentiated. Specific time trends are the controls at the baseline level, 1997. Housing
controls include average surface, the average yearly income of the household and the proportion of social
housing. Demographic controls include population and density. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for
years 1997 and 2001 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic characteristics of the municipalities.
Table A6: Descriptive statistics - Bordering Groups
Treatment Control
Mean Std Dev. Mean Std Dev. Difference t-value p-value
Vacancy Rate 6.81 3.20 6.35 3.01 -0.46 0.96 0.34
Private Vacancy Rate 6.78 3.12 6.40 3.07 -0.38 0.80 0.42
Av. Income 25008 7377 25734 7601 725 -0.64 0.52
Population 99 19445 49653 4900 6950 -14545 2.48 0.01
Population Growth 13.6 19.65 18.92 33.77 5.32 -1.34 0.18
Population Density 1317 1518 606 840 -710 3.64 0.00
Rental Value 23087 7185 20076 6011 -3010 2.95 0.00
Surface 89.92 15.15 97.61 17.98 7.69 -3.1 0.00
Primary Residence Ratio 90.05 5.68 89.47 7.03 -.58 .61 0.54
Social Housing 11.46 12.49 7.5 11.48 -3.96 2.16 0.03
Notes: Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for year 1997 plus INSEE data-sets on demographic charac-
teristics of the municipalities. Treatment group has 108 observations while Control group has 73.
40
Table 7: Vacancy rate, yearly effect
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TLV -0.186∗∗ -0.158∗ -0.078 -0.217∗∗ -0.143
95 - 97 (0.082) (0.092) (0.120) (0.111) (0.116)
TLV -0.388∗∗∗ -0.133 0.014 0.038 0.011
95 - 99 (0.114) (0.183) (0.176) (0.199) (0.168)
TLV -0.335∗∗ 0.003 0.058 0.086 0.058
95 - 01 (0.132) (0.226) (0.206) (0.234) (0.183)
TLV -0.516∗∗∗ -0.101 0.120 0.087 0.048
95 - 03 (0.129) (0.277) (0.222) (0.256) (0.208)
TLV -0.550∗∗∗ -0.156 0.137 0.074 0.044
95 - 05 (0.134) (0.241) (0.160) (0.246) (0.198)
Housing Controls X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X
Vacancy Pre-Trend X
Specific Time Trends X
N 1012 1012 1012 1012 1012
Notes: Significance is indicated by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis,
for OLS they are block bootstrapped at the urban unit level (29 clusters), for the Matching, they are
bootstrapped. Each cell represents a different regression with the first difference of the vacancy rate as
the dependent variable. Last two columns use a propensity score matching strategy to weight control
observations. Variable TLV equal 1 for taxed municipalities and 0 for non-taxed. The numbers such as 95
- 97 indicate the years compared in the first difference. All controls are as well first differentiated. Specific
time trends are the controls at the baseline level, 1995. For the matching columns, the crosses indicate the
variables that have been used for the matching procedure. Housing controls include the average surface,
the average yearly income of the household and the proportion of social housing. Demographic controls
include population and density. Vacancy Pre-Trend is the difference in vacancy rate between 1995 and
1997. Specific time trend are for all the variables in controls plus the population growth 90-99 and the
initial level of vacancy. Data comes from FILOCOM data-set for years 1995 to 2005. Treatment group has
300 observations in 6 clusters while Control group has 623 in 23 clusters per year.
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